The world?s negligence globalisation philosophy and the misadventures of space by Marzocca, Ottavio
Ottavio Marzocca. Professor of Ethical-Political Philosophy and 
Social Ethics at the University of Bari “Aldo Moro” (Italy). He has 
for many years been concerned with the contemporary French 
thought, Italian neo-Marxism and issues of geo-philosophy. 
He also has been working on the issues of governmentality and 
biopolitics. Furthermore, currently, he devotes his attention to 
the relationship between ethical and political issues and pro-
blems of space, the environment and territory. His most recent 
books are: Foucault ingovernabile. Dal bios all’ethos (Meltemi, 
Milano, 2016); Il mondo comune. Dalla virtualità alla cura (Ma-
nifestolibri, Roma, 2015); Il governo dell’ethos. La produzione 
politica dell’agire economico (Mimesis, Milano, 2011); Perché il 
governo Il laboratorio etico-politico di Foucault (Manifestolibri, 
Roma, 2007).
Contact: ottavio.marzocca@uniba.it
21
THE WORLD’S NEGLIGENCE
GLOBALISATION, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE MISADVENTURES OF SPACE
Ottavio Marzocca
Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro”
DOI: 1017450/170102
Reception date 2nd February 2017; Acceptance date 1st March 2017. This article is the 
result of research activities held at the Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, Università 
degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro”.
Abstract 
The descriptions of our epoch as a time of technological despatialization, deterri-
torialization and dematerialization deserve to be discussed in order to bring out the 
complex genealogy of the changes to which they refer. Contemporary philosophy – 
especially the reading of Bergson, Heidegger, Arendt, Schmitt, Foucault, Deleuze and 
Guattari – helps us to do so in at least two ways: first, by testifying that space and the 
material world represent a kind of obstacle to the visions prevailing in modernity, that 
give the human being a privileged relationship with time and a right to separate himself 
from the world in order to dominate it; second, showing us the ways in which spatiality 
is presented as a political stakes irreducible to both rigid territorializations and pure 
and simple despatializations. From this point of view, even the current telematic tech-
nologies are proof of this irreducibility re-spatializing the world with their systems for 
tracking, surveillance, monitoring, etc.
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Resumen
Las descripciones de nuestra época como un tiempo de desespacialización, des-
territorialización y desmaterialización tecnológica merecen ser discutidos con el fin 
de evidenciar la compleja genealogía de los cambios a los que se refieren. La filosofía 
contemporánea –especialmente a través de Bergson, Heidegger, Arendt, Schmitt, Fou-
cault, Deleuze y Guattari– nos ayuda a hacerlo en por lo menos dos maneras: en primer 
lugar, exponiendo que el espacio y el mundo material representan una especie de 
obstáculo para las visiones que prevalecen en la modernidad, que le dan al ser huma-
no una relación privilegiada con el tiempo y un derecho a separarse del mundo para 
dominarlo; en segundo lugar, mostrando las formas en que la espacialidad se presenta 
como una apuesta política irreducible tanto a las territorializaciones rígidas como a las 
desespacializaciones puras y sencillas. Desde este punto de vista, incluso las tecnologías 
telemáticas actuales son prueba de esta irreductibilidad re-espacializando al mundo con 
sus sistemas de rastreo, vigilancia, monitoreo, etc.
Palabras clave
Velocidad tecnológica, desespacialización, alienación del mundo, política del espacio. 
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Losing distances
Perhaps, even before people began to speak insistently of globalization, attention 
was paid in our society to the effects of the dematerialization of the communication 
technologies that have contributed to globalization itself, and among these effects, in-
creasing importance was given to phenomena of despatialization, i.e. the trend triggered 
by the telematic technologies towards the reduction of the role of material space and 
physical territory with regard to the main activities and relationships of contemporary 
man1 It is difficult, in fact, to deny that tele-technological globalization has long been 
causing a radical reduction of the importance of space, distances and physical relation-
ships, primarily through the multiplication of the possibility of hyper-fast communi-
cation between users located anywhere in the world. The fact remains, however, that it 
may be appropriate to try to understand to what extent this overwhelming trend rep-
resents a decisive key to the interpretation of our time. To this end, one might wonder, 
in particular, about the sense of space that our culture, at least in its more reflexive forms, 
expressed until the “computer revolution” no longer found obstacles. Which, perhaps, 
could serve, above all, to help understand the extent to which this culture was prepared 
to deal with certain consequences of this revolution. Moreover, it could serve precisely 
to problematize, and possibly to determine, in a non-trivial way, the limits of the valid-
ity of the ideas of despatialization and technological dematerialization.
1. A moment in which the talk about contemporary technological dematerialization definitively seemed to impose itself 
can be found in the important exhibition entitled “Les Immatériaux”, which took place in Paris in 1985 at the “Georges 
Pompidou” Centre. The exhibition intended, among other things, to “increase awareness of the fact that research and 
development in technical sciences and in the arts have come to the point that matter, the material, the real can no longer 
be immediately grasped and that there is the tendency for a veil of figures to be placed between reality and the mind” (J. 
Maheu, “Immatériaux”, in Album, Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris, 1985, p. 3). The exhibition was organized under the di-
rection of J. F. Lyotard, who, some years earlier, had highlighted the “historic step” caused by developments in information 
technology with his famous: La condition postmoderne, Minuit, Paris, 1979. Even before that time, especially Paul Virilio 
had begun to insist on the “despatializing” – as well as “dematerializing” – consequences of contemporary communication 
technologies. In any case, a very large number of the authors who have since analyzed the development of these technolo-
gies, have highlighted these consequences in one way or another. Among the various texts that could be referenced in this 
regard, see the P. Virilio: Vitesse et politique, Galilée, Paris, 1977; La vitesse de libération, Galilée, Paris, 1995; Cybermonde, 
la politique du pire, Les éditions Textuel, Paris, 1996; La bombe informatique, Galilée, Paris, 1998. Also see: J. Meyrowitz, 
No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985; P. Levy, L’In-
telligence collective. Pour une anthropologie du cyberespace, La Découverte, Paris, 1994; W. J. Mitchell, City of Bits: Space, 
Place, and the Infobahn, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1995; E. Fiorani, La comunicazione a rete globale, Lupetti, Milano, 
1998; S. Graham, S. Marvin, Telecommunication and the City: Electronic Spaces, Urban places, Routledge, London, 1995; F. 
Cairncross, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives, Harvard Business School 
Press, London, 2001; K. Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, Harper Collins, New 
York, 2002; M. Ciastellardi, Le architetture liquide. Dalle reti del pensiero al pensiero in rete, Edizioni Universitarie LED, 
Milano, 2009.
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Here, for my part, I would like to try to do something of the kind, referring in par-
ticular to philosophical knowledge. The general questions that I would pose as the ba-
sis for this effort would be the following: what attention has philosophy paid to space 
until recently, i.e. to this dimension of our existence of which today we seem in some 
way to be losing control, or profoundly changing our perception? What awareness has 
philosophical culture had of the possibility that space was exposed to such a prospect? 
What attention has it turned to the functions, the transformations and the importance 
of space with respect to the life of society? Of course, I do not presume to give definitive 
answers to such questions. I will limit myself, rather, to making a rough reconnaissance 
in this regard, referring especially – but not only – to some of the leading exponents of 
contemporary philosophical thought.
Time as a refuge
I will first consider the general impression that can be derived from the history of 
philosophy in the last few centuries. The sense is that philosophy has tended to favor 
time, that is, to attribute to it a greater dignity than it was willing to attribute to space. 
In particular, Michel Foucault expressed himself in this sense, arguing that philosophy, 
since the late 18th century, has gradually taken refuge in reflections on time, reflecting on 
spatiality at a lower level of intensity. Which, according to him, is explained in general 
by the fact that – after the modern scientific revolution and with the launch by the States 
of precise spatial policies – other forms of knowledge have firmly taken hold of this 
dimension and have “forced philosophy into a problematic of time. From Kant on”, says 
Foucault, “it is time that occupies the philosopher’s reflection, in Hegel, Bergson and 
Heidegger, for example. Along with this occurs a correlative disqualification of space 
that appears on the side of understanding, of the analytical, the conceptual, the dead, 
the fixed, the inert”.2
Certainly the French author does not intend to deny the enormous value of the re-
flection that – each in his own way – the great philosophers he named have, in any case, 
dedicated to the spatial dimension. Rather, he wants to show that philosophy has never 
really addressed the “problem of spaces (…) as a historical and political problem”; in his 
2. M. Foucault, “L’oeil du pouvoir”, entretien avec J.-P. Barou et M. Perrot, in M. Foucault, Dits et écrits, ed by D. Defert and 
F. Ewald, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, III, p. 193; also see the different version of this text: M. Foucault, “The Eye of Power”, in A. 
Farquharson (ed.), The impossible Prison: A Foucault Reader, Nottingham Contemporary, Nottingham (UK), 2008, p. 10. 
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opinion it has generally avoided dealing with the processes that range “from the great 
strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of housing, institutional architecture, from 
the classroom to the hospital organization, by way of all the political and economic 
implantations”; philosophy – like other humanistic knowledge – has limited itself to 
reconnecting the theme of space “to ‘nature’ – to what was given, the first determining 
factor – or to ‘physical geography’; (…) to as a kind of ‘prehistoric’ stratum”, or to “the 
residential site or the field of expansion of a people, a culture, a language or a State”.3 
In fact, many great philosophers of recent centuries (Montesquieu, Kant, Herder, 
Hegel) have turned their attention to space often in relation to the geographical di-
mension, reflecting on the territorial, environmental and geoclimatic diversity of the 
earth, and reconnecting this variety to the multiplicity and diversity of peoples and 
their cultures. Exemplary in this regard is the case of Hegel. Particularly in the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of World History, he aims to determine the weight that the different 
geographical areas have had in promoting or hindering the participation of the various 
peoples in world history. Thus, he tends to transform geographical differences into an 
instrument that distinguishes between the places and peoples with a “historical mis-
sion” and places and peoples destined to remain marginal or extraneous to the course of 
historical time. The main consequence of this distinction is the idea that the fulfillment 
of universal history has been realized in Europe as a geographical environment favor-
able to this fulfillment.4
Of course, it is almost pointless to observe that the ethnocentric hierarchy of coun-
tries and peoples, that this vision legitimates, is today shifting to an increasingly ruinous 
divergence between North and South, East and West; which is happening precisely at 
a time when “world history” should have found its beneficial and definitive successful 
completion as a result of globalization.5 In any case, it is clear that – as Foucault argues 
– an approach like this to space, on the one hand, tends to exclude from the analysis 
the consideration of the geopolitical, planning, bio-political or economic intervention 
strategies on space itself; on the other, it gives time a clear supremacy over the spatial 
dimension: the Hegelian vision, in short, turns its attention to spatiality on the condi-
tion that it functions as a geographic support of the universal power of historical time.
3. Ibid.
4. See G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Erste Hälfte, vol. I: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, 
ed. by J. Hoffmeister, Meiner, Hamburg, 1955, engl. transl.: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason 
in History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 152-209.
5. On these implications of Hegel’s view of the relationship between history and geography, see: E. Dussel, 1492: El encubri-
miento de l’otro. Hacia el origen del “mito de la Modernidad”, Plural Editores, La Paz, 1994, pp. 13-22.
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It is interesting, however, that Foucault – as we have seen – identifies in the thought 
of Kant a kind of inaugural moment of the philosophical tendency to “disqualify” space. 
It could perhaps be said that he traces one of the root causes of the “preference” of 
contemporary philosophy for temporality to the Kantian distinction between space as 
outer intuition and time as inner intuition of the human subject. In fact, Kant argues 
that time, precisely as an inner intuition, “is the formal condition of all appearances in 
general”; according to him, “all representations, whether or not they have outer things 
as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the 
inner state.” Precisely for this reason, as part of the only form of knowledge available 
to man through his senses – i.e. the phenomenal –, time stands at a higher level than 
space which, conversely, “as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a priori 
condition merely to outer intuitions”.6
Space without quality
Referring to more recent times, we can say that one of the philosophers most re-
sponsible for the “disqualification” of space to the benefit of time is certainly Henry 
Bergson, to whom Foucault himself attributes a crucial role in this regard. Bergsonian 
philosophy, in effect, makes particularly clear the consideration of space as an abstract, 
poor, cold dimension which opposes time understood as duration, i.e. as a fluid tem-
poral succession, qualitatively rich, varied and creative that man immediately perceives 
through his conscience. This “disqualification” of space to the benefit of time in Berg-
son is connected to his rejection of the spatialization of knowledge, which – according 
to him – prevails in the exact sciences which – he claims – generally study reality by 
tending to spatialize it, i.e. to define its elements, to segment it analytically, to measure 
it metrically. In this way, also the dynamism, the variability, the qualitative richness of 
time and essentially temporal phenomena – such as movement or biological and psy-
chic life – are conceived of and treated as sequences of single and discrete moments or 
elements located along an abstract, homogeneous, divisible and measurable linearity.7
But how exactly does Bergson conceive of space? In one of his major works he 
claims that it corresponds to the “conception of an empty homogeneous medium” in 
6. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Hartknoch, Riga, 1787, engl. transl.: Critique of pure reason, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp.180-181.
7. See H. Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice, Alcan, Paris, 1907, engl. transl.: Creative Evolution, Dover Publication, Mineola, 
New York, 1998, pp. 186-220. 
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which the objects of our experience can simply be broken down and placed in a static 
and discontinuous way. Therefore, an essential task on which he sets his sights is to 
free time, as a “heterogeneous reality”, from the homogenizing trap of spatialization. 
It is also precisely for this reason that, to mark the difference between the qualitative 
richness of time and the “poverty” of space, the French philosopher proposes the 
concept of duration.8
Paul Virilio – the author who has dramatized more than others the despatializing 
effects of the speed of contemporary communication technologies – argues that the 
philosophies of the time, even when they thought of the latter as duration, ignored 
or underestimated the fundamental importance of the relationship between time and 
speed. According to him, instead, a vital relationship exists between time and speed; 
duration itself is “a category of speed”, since – as Einstein demonstrated – different 
forms of duration correspond to various grades of speed or, more precisely, different 
space-time forms, different space-time systems.9 According to Virilio, Bergson “was bet-
ter situated than others” to focus on these implications of Einstein’s theory of relativity; 
but he was not able to do so, like most contemporary philosophers who have not been 
able to do so.10 
Indeed, despite having devoted a study to Einstein’s theory, Bergson refused to attri-
bute objective meaning and philosophical dignity to the idea of space-time and to the 
concept of the plurality of space-time systems, corresponding to the different speeds of 
movement of these same systems. The disagreement between philosophy and science 
that he wanted to express in this way can essentially be explained by his unwillingness 
to accept the idea that time, amalgamating and pluralizing itself with space, loses its 
irreducible specificity and its universal oneness.11 But – according to what Virilio ar-
gues – precisely in this way he denied himself the opportunity to grasp the shocking 
consequences that, already in his time, the technological speed of communication was 
beginning to exert on the space-time reality of society, the closer you got to Einstein’s 
speed of light. What was announced, according to Virilio, was a “loss of the world”, 
8. H. Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Alcan, Paris, 1889, engl. transl.: Time and Free Will: An Essay 
on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Dover Publication, Mineola, New York, 2001, pp. 90-99. On Bergson’s conception 
of space also see the Latin doctoral thesis (which accompanied the main thesis corresponding to the text just mentioned): 
H. Bergson, Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit, Alcan, Paris, 1889. 
9. P. Virilio, “Dromologia: la logica della corsa”, Conversazione con G. Daghini, in P. Virilio, La macchina che vede. L’auto-
mazione della percezione, Sugarco Edizioni, Milano, 1989, p. 162. 
10. Ibid., p. 186.
11. H. Bergson, Durée et simultanéité, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1992, engl. transl.: Duration and Simultaneity, 
Clinamen Press, Manchester, 1999.  
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a despatialization that was one with the progressive reduction of the time of interaction 
between the different sites to the insubstantiality of instantaneity.12
Dwelling in danger
Among the philosophers who – as Foucault says – are most responsible for the ten-
dency to disqualify space to the benefit of time, certainly Heidegger cannot be over-
looked. In reality, his reflection on space appears to be much more careful and intense 
than that of Bergson. In Being and Time he recognizes an essential element of being 
human in the “spatiality of Being-in-the-world”, which also implies – according to him 
– an idea of space irreducible to that of a merely measurable homogeneous reality. On 
the other hand, according to Heidegger, this spatiality of man’s being does not consist 
in a pure being in space, but rather in a being with the beings and in connection with 
them, from which no man can be disengaged or “extracted” at will. It is true, however, 
that in Being and Time this spatial constitution of being human is subject to the foun-
dational function that temporality performs as the existential premise of the being of 
man himself. Here it is time, in short, that represents for Heidegger the true way into the 
ontological dimension, a way that man can trace precisely by regaining the temporality 
of his mortal nature.13
All this does not take away from the fact that, at least in the last decades of his life, 
space assumes a primary importance in Heidegger, especially with the reflection that he 
devotes to dwelling. In the famous conference called Building, Dwelling, Thinking, the 
German philosopher presented the ideas “to be a human being” and “to be on the earth” 
as coinciding, stating that “to be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. 
It means to dwell”. He also stated that “the relationship between man and space is none 
other than dwelling, though essentially”.14 Here he clearly defined the spatiality accord-
ing to a “topological” vision, in the sense that – in his opinion – “spaces receive their es-
sential being from locales and not from ‘space’”.15 It is through the locale that man finds 
his dwelling relationship with the earth and, through this, his being a human being.
12. P. Virilio, Cybermonde, la politique du pire, pp. 44-45.
13. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1953, engl. transl.: Being and Time, State University of New York 
Press, Albany (NY), 1996, pp. 49-122, 335-340.
14. M. Heidegger, “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken”, in M. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Neske, Pfullingen 1954, engl. transl.: 
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, in M. Heidegger, Basic Writing, edited by D. F. Krell, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1993, 
pp. 349, 359.
15. Ibid., p. 356.
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The relationship between dwelling and building proves crucial in this regard, as evi-
denced –according to Heidegger – by the example of the bridge. Constructed properly, it 
makes man’s dwelling possible, constituting a locale which is given as such by gathering 
and setting off space for the river, its banks, its surroundings, the mood of the sky and 
so on.16 The example of the bridge also shows how the locale is a condition in which 
man can grasp his own mortality and his relationship with transcendence: in fact, “the 
bridge initiates the lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro, so that they may get 
to other banks and in the end, as mortals, to the other side”; it, in short, “gathers, as a 
passage that crosses, before the divinities”.17 
Here, then, man’s mortality finds in the topological dimension of dwelling a pos-
sibility for access to the authenticity of being which in Being and Time was identified 
almost exclusively in temporality. Through the example of the bridge, Heidegger also 
makes it clear that the dwelling relationship with the earth may take place both when 
man is established in places, and when he passes through them: places are not really 
places if they are not also passageways. They, in fact, open and set off spaces “for settle-
ment and lodging,” for a permanent settlement or a temporary camp, or – it could be 
said – for both sedentary and nomadic modes of living.18
This opening of Heidegger’s thinking toward mobility should not, in any case, be 
misunderstood: it does not imply a renunciation of the stability of the relationship with 
the world, that dwelling allows. In fact – for Heidegger – the epochal problem that we 
need to think of today, in part to adequately capture and try to overcome the crisis of 
dwelling, is not the “lack of houses”, but it is the “homelessness” of man, his rootlessness 
caused by the domination of technology.19 We can also assume that this implies, on the 
part of Heidegger, an exaltation of the unique entrenchment of peoples in “their own” 
places.20 However, nothing prevents us from comparing Heidegger’s idea of rootlessness 
to that of “loss of the world” which Virilio proposes, to the extent that both refer to the 
danger of the technological dissolution of man’s relationship with the earth’s spatiality 
in general.21 In any case, Virilio argues that even the author of Being and Time did not 
16. Ibid., p. 354.
17. Ibid., pp. 354 and 355. 
18. Ibid., p. 356.
19. Ibid., p. 363; see also M. Heidegger, Gelassenheit, Neske, Pfullingen 1959, engl. transl.: “Memorial Address”, in M. Heide-
gger, Discourse on Thinking: a Translation of Gelassenheit, Harper & Row, New York, 1969, pp. 43-57.
20. For a reading contrary to this hypothesis, see C. Resta, Il luogo e le vie. Geografie del pensiero in Heidegger, Franco Angeli, 
Milano 1996, pp. 63-126.
21. P. Virilio, Cybermonde, la politique du pire, pp. 44-45.
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pay the necessary attention to the role that speed plays to that effect, even though he 
reflected intensely on the nature of the technique.22 
In fact, Heidegger does not completely neglect the importance of speed. Indeed, 
in one of his best-known texts (The Thing), he dwells on the fact that in our era “all 
distances in time and space are shrinking” because of transport vehicles and means of 
telecommunication: “Man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time. 
He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself 
at the shortest range”. In this way – according to Heidegger – man fools himself into be-
lieving that he is attaining a greater proximity to the world, but, in fact, he finds himself 
in a “uniform distancelessness” in which “everything is equally far and equally near”, 
“everything is neither far nor near – is, as it were, without distance”.23 Even for the au-
thor of Being and Time, in short, the new technological instruments do not bring man 
closer to the world. Rather, the difference between distance and proximity is dissolved 
and both the one and the other are lost.
Heidegger, therefore, gives important proof of the fact that the attitude of contem-
porary philosophy toward space cannot be reduced to a general tendency to disqual-
ification. However, it does appear to be true that – as Foucault argues – not even he, 
despite his considerable attention to space, considers it to be a field of political relations 
or power strategies. Foucault – as we shall see – tried to remedy this shortcoming that, 
in his opinion, could be detected in all of contemporary philosophy. In this regard, how-
ever, he seems to want to deliberately ignore the contribution made by authors such as 
Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt – from very different points of view – to the reflection 
on the spatiality of the material world and its setting in political terms.
World alienation
Of these two authors, Hannah Arendt offers us key elements for, first of all, framing 
the relationship between space and politics from a different point of view than that 
of the mere exercise of power and, second, for understanding important differences 
between the spatiality of politics and other material contexts of the human condition. 
From her famous reflection on the three forms of the vita activa (labor, work, action) 
22. P. Virilio, “Dromologia: la logica della corsa”, p. 162.
23. M. Heidegger, “Das Ding”, in M. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Neske, Pfullingen 1954, pp. 37-59, engl. transl.: “The 
Thing”, in M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper Collins, New York, 2001, pp. 163-164.
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what first emerges – as is well-known – is the fundamental distinction between the pub-
lic space of the polis and the private space of the oikos; but even more important is the 
broader distinction between the three large spatialities of the human condition, which 
the author highlights: the earth, the world and the public realm. The earth corresponds 
to the dimension of natural life, that set of basic needs to which man responds with 
labor and the consumption of its products; the world is, instead, the artificial context 
defined by enduring things, “from the simplest use object to the masterwork of art”, that 
man produces through work, thus guaranteeing the permanence of a set of objective 
reference points of his existence; the public realm, finally, corresponds to the dimension 
of active citizenship which only effectively takes place if men interact freely in their plu-
rality through political action.24
What we cannot ignore is that – according to Hannah Arendt – both the natural 
dimension of the human condition (the earth) and the one corresponding to political 
activity (the public realm) are marked by an essential instability: in the first case, men 
are exposed to the danger of being absorbed and overwhelmed by the relentless cyclical 
nature of biological life, of needs and their satisfaction through the continuous produc-
tion of consumer goods; in the second, however, their condition appears to be unstable 
because of the ephemeral character of political actions and speeches and for their con-
stant succession. In neither case is man guaranteed the certainty of a permanent condi-
tion. What, conversely, can provide stability in these two situations is the guarantee of a 
relationship with the long lasting world of artificial enduring things produced through 
work. This, according to Arendt, applies above all to the natural dimension of the earth 
on which life takes place. 
Only we who have erected the objectivity of a world of our own from what nature 
gives us, who have built it into the environment of nature so that we are pro-
tected from her, can look upon nature as something “objective”. Without a world  
between men and nature, there is eternal movement, but no objectivity.25
A similar argument, on the other hand, applies to the public realm: it is essential-
ly ephemeral, since it “rises directly out of acting together, the sharing of words and 
deeds”, and lasts as long as these activities last; therefore, it can acquire permanence 
only on the condition of finding its own stable environment through the construction 
24. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London, 1998, pp. 7-11, 22-37, 122, 136-139.
25. Ibid., p. 137.
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of an artificial and long-lasting common world. It is with regards to this need that “the 
Greek solution” – i.e. the polis – assumes an exemplary value. Of course, it “is not the 
city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it rises directly 
out of acting together”;26 nevertheless, it allows free men to consistently act, interact, 
stand out and leave a trace of their actions only if it is based on a stable material and 
legal organization, i.e. on an artificial world created through the work of the architect 
and the legislator.27
Having thought about the relationship between man and his condition through this 
complex spatial articulation, Hannah Arendt also took into consideration the serious 
detachment from the material world which modern man has been led to by various 
historical factors. It is a process that the author defines with the expression “world alien-
ation”, arguing that the modern age coincides essentially with this alienation. This is 
thought to primarily derive from the “shrinkage of the globe” which began with the 
great geographical discoveries and has been completed by the vertiginous reduction of 
distances through the speed of contemporary media; in the final stage of this process, 
the invention of the airplane gave man the ability “of leaving the surface of the earth 
altogether”, showing that “any decrease of terrestrial distance can be won only at the 
price of putting a decisive distance between man and earth, of alienating man of his 
immediately surroundings”.28
Moreover, a similar process derived from the Protestant Reformation. The “inner-
wordly asceticism” which Weber attributes to Calvinism is a renunciation of the world, 
it is an “innerwordly alienation” that is attained precisely by remaining and working 
more and more intensely in the world. This form of world alienation has contributed, 
on the one hand, to the formation of the capitalist spirit and, on the other hand, to the 
beginning of a systematic accumulation of wealth which has its origins in the “expropri-
ation of the peasantry, which was the unforeseen consequence of the expropriation of 
church property”, caused by the Reformation itself.29 In this way, with the appropriative 
expropriation of properties dating back to previous eras, nascent capitalism triggered 
the cycle of destructive appropriation and consumption of the world in which we find 
ourselves today: “all property” is now “destroyed in the process of its appropriation, all 
26. Ibid., p. 198.
27. Ibid., pp. 194-195.
28. Ibid., p. 250, 251. 
29. Ibid., pp. 251-252.
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things devoured in the process of its production, and the stability of the world under-
mined in a constant process of change”.30 
Finally, Galileo’s invention of the telescope and the “development of a new science 
that considers the nature of the earth from the view point of the universe” radically con-
tributed to such upheavals.31 One of the main causes of the gradual separation of man 
from sensitive nature and from his own geophysical condition lies exactly in the uni-
versal impact of modern science. In fact, according to Arendt, with the new science not 
only do the laws of the infinite universe refer to its unfathomable mathematical struc-
ture, but also the “terrestrial sense data and movements” are reduced “to mathematical 
symbols”. In this way, science frees “man from the shackles of earth-bound experience 
and his power of cognition from the shackles of finitude”.32
According to the author, the prevalence of subjectivism in modern philosophy, start-
ing with Descartes, has also greatly contributed to this general separation of man from 
tangible reality. He, taking doubt as the cornerstone of thinking, made the sense of this 
separation clear: the human capacity to think while doubting becomes the indispens-
able condition for access to the real world. This is no longer a “given” and can even 
remain inaccessible; what still remains is the certainty of the reality of thought itself, 
inasmuch as it is supervised by doubt. In this way, what emerges is perhaps the most sig-
nificant consequence of the various processes of modernity’s “world alienation”: “what 
men now have in common is not the world but the structure of their minds, and this 
they cannot have in common, strictly speaking”.33
It is worth highlighting at least one of the various implications of Arendt’s thought 
here: modern man’s distancing from the spatiality of the material world can be ex-
plained not only by a set of economic and technological factors, but also by the emer-
gence of a certain ethos, a certain way of being in the world: from this point of view, 
we can say that man is able to practice, increasingly more actively, a universal knowl-
edge that transcends the earth and an undefined manumission of the world, which 
relativizes its permanence, provided he abstracts from the world itself his thinking 
and his existence, his living and his dwelling, his laboring, his building and his acting.
30. Ibid., p. 252.
31. Ibid., p. 248.
32. Ibid., p. 265.
33. Ibid., p. 283; see also ibid., pp. 271-280. 
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The unlikely solidity of the modern nomos
Carl Schmitt also offers us elements useful for reconstructing the more or less re-
mote causes of our present relationship with the world. Furthermore, he does this by 
carrying out a reflection on spatiality in clearer and more explicitly political terms than 
Hannah Arendt. According to the German author, as is well-known, a political order can 
only be based, first of all, on the precise organization of space. In this sense, he insists 
on the fact that, at the beginning of modernity, the discovery of the New World opened 
an era of conquest and partition of the land by the great European powers, which – ac-
cording to him – made the appropriation and the possession of Earth’s space its nomos, 
the foundational principle of the modern political order: on the basis of this nomos they 
have, since then, organized their States and regulated their relations, including war.34 
Schmitt, moreover, characterizes this political order by also showing the specific ap-
proach in which the sea was key: unlike dry land, which was ordered by the borders 
between sovereign states, the open sea was not subject to any territorial sovereignty, it 
was left in a state of general availability, as a spatial element profoundly different from 
the mainland.35 As is well-known, the clear definition of this situation – according to 
the author – was the source of the great advances of the legal-political civilization, in 
particular, the limitation of war to the sole purpose of conquest: the danger of war 
without limits, which is present in religious conflicts and in civil wars, was noticeably 
contained.36
If today it is said that globalization has put an end to the political order of modernity 
since the technological developments that characterize it radically reduce the impor-
tance of spatiality, this is because Schmitt’s theses generally appear to be convincing: for 
the most part it is believed that they describe what preceded that which is happening to-
day; at the same time, however, they are considered “outdated” because the importance 
of the spatial organization of political structures seems decidedly in decline today.37 
What we risk overlooking, however, it is that Schmitt’s theory of the modern “nomos of 
34. C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, Greven, Köln, 1950, engl. transl.: The Nomos of the Earth, Telos Press, New York, 2006; 
C. Schmitt, Land und Meer, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1954, engl. transl.: Land and Sea, Plutarch Press, Washington, 1997.
35. C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 172-184.
36. Ibid., pp. 140-171.
37. See, in particular, C. Galli: Spazi politici. L’età moderna e l’età globale, il Mulino, Bologna, 2001; Id., La guerra globale, La-
terza, Roma-Bari, 2002. Among the many studies on the decline of the modern political order which, more or less directly, 
have Schmitt’s reflection on the nomos of the land among their premises, see: M Cacciari, Geofilosofia dell’Europa, Adelphi, 
Milano, 1994; S. Ortino, Il nuovo Nomos della Terra, il Mulino, Bologna, 1999; D. Palano, Fino alla fine del mondo. Saggi sul 
‘politico’ nella rivoluzione spaziale contemporanea, Liguori, Napoli, 2010.
the earth” is one with the announcement of the decline of the same order it describes;38 
in it, in particular, the complementariness between the precise territorial division of 
the state sovereignty and the free availability of the maritime space immediately ap-
pears to be a totally asymmetrical relationship between virtually irreconcilable ways of 
understanding and treating space; the same comparison between on-land state powers 
and maritime state powers appears destined to be quickly translated into a progressive 
attrition of this seemingly balanced complementariness.
In this sense, Schmitt first comments on the fact that in this situation “the dry land 
would belong to a score of sovereign states. The sea, on the other hand, would belong 
to nobody, but in reality, it would belong to a single country: England”39. He also high-
lights the profound diversity of ways of making war which correspond to the land and 
the sea: while the ground war is fought by armies “in open, pitched battle”, the methods 
of maritime war cannot be reduced to “naval combat”, but also include “bombardment, 
the blockade of enemy shores, and the capture of neutral and merchantmen, in virtue 
of the right to capture”. Through the “starvation blockade”, in particular, maritime war 
indiscriminately affects “the entire population of the involved territory”.40 All this, in 
fact, happens because the sea is a deterritorialization factor that destabilizes the political 
sovereignty based on the ownership of land, which is the essential condition – accord-
ing to Schmitt – of the modern political order.41 The seeds of deterritorialization, on the 
other hand, are what caused the end of the “complementariness” between land and sea 
with the prevailing, first of air navigation, and then the means of telecommunication.42 
Therefore, Schmitt’s discourse is an important prerequisite to the analyses that speak 
of globalization in terms of despatialization, not only because it defines the political and 
spatial order that today is coming to an end, but also because it clearly foreshadows the 
crisis of this spatial order. Nevertheless, from his point of view, the parable of the mod-
ern political order does not simply translate into a progressive despatialization. Rather, 
it produces a sequence of stages in which different spatial dimensions prevail: the land, 
the sea and, finally, the air. Therefore, it can be said that Schmitt’s reflection is reducible 
neither to a theory of the unequivocal solidity of the modern nomos of the earth nor to 
a generic foreshadowing of the despatialization of which we speak today. 
38. M. Cacciari, Geofilosofia dell’Europa, pp. 105-130.
39. C. Schmitt, Land and Sea, p. 46. 
40. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
41. In this regard see the observations of A. Bolaffi, “Presentazione”, in C. Schmitt, Terra e mare. Una considerazione sulla 
storia del mondo, Giuffrè, Milano, 1986, p. 23-26.
42. C. Schmitt, Land and Sea, pp. 56-59. 
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These implications of Schmitt’s discourse are important because – among other 
things – they urge us not to confuse the concepts of deterritorialization and despati-
alization. The distinction between the two can be useful to understand, in particular, 
whether for some time in our history there have been deterritorialization processes that 
not only do not involve a despatialization, but may also give rise to forms of re-spatial-
ization and, sometimes, even re-territorialization. Moreover, this distinction can help us 
at least to hypothesize that forms of re-spatialization are present in our days. 
Protean space
Foucault’s research on “spaces as a historical and political problem” is particularly 
fruitful on the importance of the re-spatialization processes. Despite not having made 
specific reflections on the terrestrial dimension, in his studies on power he effectively 
examined the spatial aspects of the transformation of our society. This is the case of his 
analyses of disciplinary institutions (prisons, schools, colleges, factories, barracks, hos-
pitals, etc.) which have constituted a fundamental system in the “government of men” 
since about the 18th century. These institutions – in his opinion – are based on a precise 
structuring of space, since they consist mostly in well-defined and circumscribed areas. 
They are also organized by spatial divisions and distributions of bodies: partitions in 
college dormitories; specifically, places assigned to the sick in hospitals, to workers in 
factories, to school children in schools, and so on. They organize these distributions 
under the principle of “functional sites”, for example, by connecting the positions of 
individual workers in factories to particular tasks, or by isolating infectious patients in 
medical clinics. They create “serial spaces”, organizing sets of individuals in lines, rows, 
ordered sequences, to establish hierarchies of value, merit, efficiency or capacity. Ulti-
mately, they are systems that control the mobility of people and things, since they filter, 
slow down, and supervise the movement taking place in cities, above all.43
The modern state – according to Foucault – soon realized the importance of these 
and other forms of intervention on space; therefore, it has used them as techniques for 
governing society from the very beginning of its history. Hence, it can be said that its 
special relationship with the land was rapidly downsized in favor of a more complex 
political approach to space: the effective exercise of state power cannot be based solely 
43. M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Gallimard, Paris, 1975, engl. transl.: Discipline and Punish. The 
Birth of the Prison, Random House, New York, 1977, pp. 141-148.
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on the possession of the territory, exercised by the defense of its borders, the repression 
of internal enemies and the taxation of land-based resources. It requires, above all, the 
ability to govern men by punitive, educational, productive, and healthcare techniques 
and institutions, which, in turn, implies the need to manage space by means of urban 
planning, architecture, collective facilities, and so on.
In a well-known course, held in 1978, Foucault developed this line of research, point-
ing to the three main ways of politically organizing space which – according to him – 
have been established in modernity. The first corresponds to the centralized control of 
the geographical territory, typical of the sovereign power exercised by subjugating those 
who live within the boundaries of a state through legislative, military and fiscal means; 
the second corresponds to the architectural organization of an abstract and hierarchical 
space, finalized to the exercise of disciplinary power that applies especially to the bodies 
and behaviors of single individuals through various forms of control and surveillance; 
the third, finally, hypothesizes space as a collective milieu, as a dynamic and complex 
environment in which natural and artificial elements and processes interact: climate, 
geophysical characteristics, collective habits, ways of living, and the movement of goods, 
persons, water, miasma, disease, etc. The latter form of spatialization corresponds to 
the biopolitical government of society, through which – according to Foucault – there 
is a shift in emphasis from the territory to the population: it is this that, starting in the 
second half of the 18th century, has been established as a privileged government object, 
as the “multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist 
biologically bound to the materiality within which they live”.44 Finally, it is important to 
consider that the city has a fundamental role in each of these spatial organizations, as it 
is itself permeated by them.45
What, of course, Foucault allows us to think of when proposing this genealogy of 
modern spaces of power is that first the disciplinary strategies and then also the bio-po-
litical government trigger the relative deterritorialization of the exercise of power, pro-
cesses far from being reducible to a decrease of the importance of spatial materiality. 
Therefore, it can be said that he, too, indirectly invites us not to adapt too easily to the 
analysis and narratives that today indefinitely emphasize tendencies to despatialization: 
if it is legitimate to think that in our era the bio-political and disciplinary functions of 
power do not disappear, but rather are even updated with the assistance of telematics 
44. M. Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France. 1977-1978, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2004, engl. 
transl.: Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, p. 21.
45. Ibid., pp. 12-23.
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technologies, it is also reasonable to conclude that spatiality continues to assert itself, 
change and evolve as an essential dimension, even through the metamorphoses of these 
functions. It cannot at all be excluded that the telematics technologies contribute to an 
intense reorganization of spatial policies that lie beyond the territorializing approach. 
It is also in this sense, in fact, that it is possible to interpret the developments of the so-
called “geo-spatial web”, the “geo-browsers” (like Google Earth), the “geo-surveillance” 
systems, the electronic tracking and monitoring of all kinds of activity and physical 
movement.46 
Towards space without a world?
If these are plausible hypotheses, what can be hypothesized instead on the forms and 
on the specific consequences of the processes of deterritorialization? On these issues we 
can refer, in particular, to the analyses of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on the glo-
balization of capitalism. Although these authors tend to “exalt” the liberating potential 
of the resulting deterritorialization processes, they also highlight the impossibility to 
isolate these processes from those of territorialization and reterritorialization with which 
the first cross or continuously alternate. Furthermore, Guattari particularly shows him-
self to be aware of the risk that the deterritorializing thrusts of contemporary capitalism 
entail serious “earthly” alterations of the ecological balance, as well as forms of “mental” 
and political regression of society.47 
Contextualizing our present time from a similar angle, we can easily find that today 
neither the processes of technological deterritorialization nor their despatializing effects 
prevent opposite processes from occurring. For example, in this sense it is important to 
consider that today the sea is no longer a truly “smooth” space irreducible to any par-
tition.48 While the heart of the oceans still seems to be free from rigid divisions, many 
other maritime areas are increasingly subject to substantial appropriations and precise 
46. See, among other studies: A. Scharl, K. Tochtermann (eds.), The Geospatial Web, Springer London Ltd., London, 2007; 
J. Döring, T. Thielmann (eds.), Mediengeographie: Theorie, Analyse, Diskussion, Transcript, Bielefeld, 2009; H. A. Karimi, 
Advanced Location-Based Technologies and Services, CRC Press, Baca Raton-London-New York, 2013; R. Wilken, G. Goggin 
(eds.), Locative Media, Routledge, New York-Oxon, 2014.
47. See: G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Mille Plateaux, Minuit, Paris, 1980, engl. transl.: A Thousand Plateaus, University of Minne-
sota Press, Minneapolis, London, 1987; F. Guattari, Les trois écologies, Galilée, Paris, 1989, engl. transl.: The Three Ecologies, 
Continuum, New York, 2008; F. Guattari, Piano sul pianeta. Capitale mondiale integrato e globalizzazione, Ombre corte, 
Verona 1997; see also: C. Raffestin, “Territorializzazione, deterritorializzazione, riterritorializzazione e informazione”, in A. 
Turco, Regione e regionalizzazione, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1984, pp. 69-82. 
48. On this issue see G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 474-482.
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allocations in areas intended – besides for mobility of naval traffic and fishing – for 
“sedentary” uses and structures: mining, pipelines, wind farms, aquaculture, biotech-
nological exploitation of marine organisms, etc. 49
Moreover, today we are often faced with subjective forms of the reterritorialization 
of relations with the world, implemented – in ways that are sometimes neo-identitarian, 
neo-archaic and xenophobic – especially by societies or communities subjected to the 
marginalizing effects of the dominant processes.50 This does not only happen as a reac-
tion to the fact that the flows of communication and the global economy are spiraling 
away from the immediate activities that take place in physical locations; it also happens 
because these places are subject to tangible and often devastating deterritorializations 
on the material plane51 The current processes of deterritorialization, in fact, should be 
recognized not only in the telematic relativization of the importance of geographical 
locations and distances, but also in the unlimited urbanization of land surface and in 
the indefinite expansion of the metropolis that mark our era. These are processes which 
– as claimed by Alberto Magnaghi – tend to destroy the local areas as spatial formations 
with historical and natural specificity and structures capable of reproducing themselves 
in the long term. From this point of view, the current explosion of urbanization, on the 
one hand, deterritorializes, and, on the other, produces new spaces increasingly lacking 
in human, historical and ecosystemic qualities.52 
Almost all of these trends can be explained in large part by the political hegemony 
that neoliberalism exerts today on the government of space, as well as of society. In 
this tableau, contemporary cities – distributed on a hierarchy dominated by “global 
cities” – are increasingly areas in which major economic entities (real estate, financial 
and commercial capital) intervene as privileged partners of the local public authorities. 
Therefore, they are becoming, above all, places of the deregulation of the use of building 
land and the privatization of public spaces. The deterritorialized urban structures of 
the districts for business, shopping, consumption, tourism flows, large exhibitions; the 
gentrification of city centers; the creation of gated communities for the wealthiest social 
classes, of slums and new ghettos for the poorest, or “detention” centers for immigrants 
49. See N. Escach, “De la mer en partage au partage de la mer”, in Le Monde diplomatique, 748, 2016, pp. 20-21.
50. See: F. Guattari, The Three Ecologies, pp. 41-43; G. Marramao, Passaggio a Occidente. Filosofia e globalizzazione, Bollati 
Boringhieri, Torino, 2003, pp. 86-87.
51. F. Guattari, The Three Ecologies, p. 29.
52. A. Magnaghi, Il Progetto locale. Verso la coscienza di luogo, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2010, pp. 23-43. 
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emerge as exemplary results of an overall decontextualization of the concrete areas of 
life, of dwelling and of interaction among men.53 
From a general point of view we can say that these and other similar processes are 
“alienating” the terrestrial and worldly, common and public multidimensionality of our 
world, but – at the same time – they are concretely affecting and deeply redefining its 
spatiality. Ultimately, these too appear to disprove not so much the idea of technological 
despatialization, as the propensity to regard it as the key to a decisive understanding of 
our age, or even as a virtually all-encompassing “destiny”. 
53. On these issues, see: D. Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governan-
ce in Late Capitalism”, in Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, 71, 1, 1989, pp. 3-17; D. Harvey, Rebel Cities: 
From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution, Verso, London-New York, 2012; S. Sassen, Cities in a World Economy, 
Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2006; Ead., “The Global City: introducing a Concept”, in Brown Journal of World 
Affairs, XI, 2, 2005, pp. 27-43; A. Petti, Arcipelaghi e enclave: architettura dell’ordinamento spaziale contemporaneo, Bruno 
Mondadori, Milano, 2007; U. Rossi, A. Vanolo, Geografia politica urbana, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2010; V. De Lucia, Le mie 
città. Mezzo secolo di urbanistica in Italia, Diabasis, Reggio Emilia, 2010; E. W. Soja, Seeking Spatial Justice, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2010; G. Semi, Gentrification. Tutte le città come Disneyland?, il Mulino, Bologna, 2015.
